Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger (R) Elected 2003, 1st term up Jan. 2007
Born:	July 30, 1947, Thal, Austria
Home:	Pacific Palisades
Education:	U. of WI-Superior, B.A. 1979
Religion:	Catholic
Marital Status:	married (Maria Shriver)
Professional Career:	Bodybuilder, 1965-1980; Chairman of the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports 1990-93; Actor, 1970-2003.
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Gray Davis, the governor of California, was elected in 1998 and 2002--only the fourth Democratic governor of California in the 20th century (and only the second not named Brown). Davis grew up in Connecticut and, after age 11, in Los Angeles; he graduated from Stanford and Columbia Law School, then served in the Army in Vietnam, where he earned a Bronze Star. In 1969 he returned to California and almost immediately plunged into politics. In 1973 he worked on Tom Bradley's first successful campaign for mayor; in 1974, at 31, he ran for state treasurer, and lost the primary to former Speaker Jess Unruh. Later that year he worked on Jerry Brown's successful campaign for governor, and in 1975 he became Brown's chief of staff. To the always improvisatory and provocative Brown, Davis was a balance wheel: well-organized, unflappable, propitiating conventional politicians and bureaucrats, learning the ways of the powers-that-be not only in Sacramento but across the state. When Brown launched into the 1982 Senate campaign that he lost to Pete Wilson, Davis moved to Westside Los Angeles and, preempting serious primary opposition, won a safe Democratic seat in the Assembly. There he served two terms as a conventional California liberal. No other state legislative seat in the country had as many big Democratic contributors, and Davis cultivated them tirelessly.

That enabled him to move from top-level staffer and Assembly insider to statewide office. In 1986 he ran for controller, the one statewide position with significant patronage, and won; in 1990, Davis cruised to reelection. In 1992 he made his one false step, running against Feinstein for the nomination for the last two years of Wilson's Senate term; he ran ads comparing Feinstein to convicted tax evader Leona Helmsley and enraged her and many feminists in the ''year of the woman.'' He lost the primary 57%-33%. But in 1994 he recovered and ran for lieutenant governor. As in 1986, he chose his spot well. His fundraising capacity deterred other potentially strong candidates; his base in the liberal Westside was strong enough to allow him to take moderate positions on some issues, like supporting the death penalty; his knowledge of state government made him an eminently respectable choice for editorial writers and endorsement groups. He won the primary easily and, while Wilson was beating Democrat Kathleen Brown by 55%-40%, Davis was elected by 52%-40% over a poorly financed Republican.

It was no secret that Davis was aiming to run to succeed the term-limited Wilson, with whom he had almost no relationship. Politics and government are everything to Davis: he and his wife live in a tiny West Hollywood apartment; he has never made large amounts of money and his taste for California social life is undetectable. It was widely thought also that he was unelectable--too boring and uncharismatic, many said, too gray. Two self-financed candidates entered the Democratic primary. Former Northwest Airlines Co-Chairman Al Checchi, with a net worth around $550 million, called for striking education reforms; he spent more than $38 million on his campaign. Congresswoman Jane Harman, after three terms representing the Los Angeles beachfront, decided to enter the race in March 1998. She argued that as a woman, she was better able to listen to and understand Californians; she also spent freely of her own money and raised more to spend $20 million.

But Davis was able to take advantage of mistakes made by the big money candidates. In March Harman surged momentarily into a lead in the polls, and Checchi ran negative ads against her. The result was that both sank in the polls. If Davis was heavily outspent by his rivals, he was able to use his Westside contacts to raise $10 million, an impressive amount in any context except this one. The result was a blowout victory for Davis: of the votes cast for Democrats, he won 58%, to 21% for Checchi and 20% for Harman.

In the general election Davis positioned himself shrewdly. Sensing the mood of the voters, he called for an end to the confrontations promoted by Republicans over issues like capital punishment, welfare for immigrants and racial quotas and preferences. The Republican nominee was Attorney General Dan Lungren. In polls until midyear he ran roughly even with Davis and the other Democrats. Until well into October he emphasized the crime issue, and tried to argue that Davis was a closet liberal. But Davis's long record supporting capital punishment gave him no opening. Lungren ran few ads and talked little about education, which polls showed to be far and away the number one issue; Davis, whose party had mostly run the public schools, was able to establish himself as the candidate who would reform them. When Davis battered him for his opposition to abortion, Lungren could only say that as a believing Catholic he opposed abortion--not a good excuse for many voters in this increasingly secular state--and that the only relevant issues were parental consent and partial-birth abortions.

Davis won by the landslide margin of 58%-38%--a margin of the magnitude of George Deukmejian's 61%-37% in 1986, Jerry Brown's 56%-36% in 1978, Ronald Reagan's 58%-42% in 1966 and Pat Brown's 60%-40% in 1958. California became only the second state (Hawaii was the other) with a Democratic governor, two Democratic senators, a Democratic House delegation and a Democratic legislature. It was a victory as sweeping as that of Tony Blair's New Labour party in Britain in May 1997 and left Davis, like Blair, with a mandate to pursue conciliatory moderate policies not so far out of line as one might think with the confrontational policies of his more conservative predecessors. He also came into office at a time when California's surging economy was producing budget surpluses--very different from the early 1990s, when Pete Wilson announced a $14 billion deficit.

Davis pledged to ''govern neither from the left nor the right, but from the center,'' and in his first two years kept his word. Education he proclaimed as his ''first, second and third'' priorities. Davis called a special session of the legislature and presented four bills--for peer review for teachers, enhanced reading instruction, a school-rating system and a standardized test for high schools. Democratic legislators watered them down, but in March 1999 versions of all four were passed, and Davis claimed victory. He vetoed laws that would have undone Proposition 227 by restoring bilingual education and Proposition 209 by reimposing racial quotas and preferences; but he declined to appeal a federal judge's ruling against Proposition 187. He vetoed liberals' bills that would have banned racial profiling (though he signed a study of whether it was occurring a year later) and revised the "three strikes and you're out" law. He negotiated an HMO regulation bill that stopped short of what liberals wanted. He opposed trial lawyers' proposal to raise the cap on medical malpractice awards. He signed several gun control bills in 1999, but said he would veto any others until he saw how those worked. He negotiated an agreement that allowed Indian casinos, but barred other casinos from the state. He opposed gay marriage and a bill to give rights to live-in partners, but signed a bill banning harassment of gays in schools and one setting up a domestic partners registry. Working with the legislature, he produced on-time budgets with big spending increases and some tax cuts, as revenues came gushing in.

By the end of 2000 Davis was the colossus of California government. Of Democratic legislators he said, "Their job is to implement my vision." Then in 2001 came two crises that Davis had not anticipated and which voters came to believe he handled poorly. The first was about electricity. In 1996 California passed electricity deregulation, in a bill embraced by the utilities and praised by just about every civic voice; Davis had no responsibility for it. Importantly, the bill was not actually deregulation. Consumers were guaranteed no rate increase until 2002, and the electric utilities were required to buy all their electricity in a state-run spot market and could not, as businesses usually do, hedge against higher prices by entering into long-term contracts. In summer 2000 energy prices spiked up, for not totally unpredictable reasons--natural gas prices rose, low rainfall held hydroelectric power production down, no new power plant has been built in California with its tight environmental laws and nitpicking regulators for more than 10 years. Rolling blackouts started in January 2001. California, with the most advanced economy anywhere, was suddenly living in the Third World.

Davis's initial response was to allow higher rates briefly and promise to avoid them hereafter, and he once said that he could solve the problem in 20 minutes if he raised rates; he evidently feared that so-called consumer advocates would resort to ballot initiatives that would wreck the system. In January, Davis asked George W. Bush to continue a Clinton administration order requiring suppliers to sell power to California utilities; Bush said he would extend it for two weeks, but that California would have to fix its own deregulation law. In February Davis persuaded the legislature to approve a bill to let the state buy power through long-term contracts with revenue bonds and to pass it along to the utilities; the measure also included higher rates for consumers who exceeded baseline usage, a measure that could have much greater impact in Republican-leaning Heartland California, where air conditioning is a must for comfortable living, than in mostly Democratic Coastal California, where air conditioning is usually optional. And Davis ordered 20% rebates to consumers who cut their usage 20% from the previous year. Later that month, Davis agreed to buy Southern California Edison's transmission grid and to guarantee its bonds to pay off its debts. But Davis had difficulty obtaining electricity at rates that would prevent increases to consumers. In March the Public Utilities Commission ordered a $5 billion a year rate increase; Davis said he had no part in the decision. In April Pacific Gas & Electric announced it was going into bankruptcy. Three days later, Davis and Southern California Edison announced that the company would sell its transmission lines. Over the next months Davis got the legislature to authorize state purchase of the transmission lines, to be funded by $12 billion in bonds. The state went out into the marketplace and purchased electricity for $6 billion at what was inevitably a peak price, since California is such a large purchaser. California consumers sharply curtailed their use of electricity, and federal regulators agreed to temporary limits on electricity prices. The predicted summer blackouts failed to materialize, and the crisis passed--but the state had undertaken huge new obligations, one major company was bankrupt, the other deep in debt and electricity rates had risen.

Davis's other unanticipated problem was the budget crisis. Until the beginning of 2001 revenues had come gushing into the state. Davis and the legislature responded by increasing spending, from $74 billion to $101 billion in four years. Spending rose 13% in the 1999-2000 fiscal year and 14% in 2000-01. The state payroll increased from 282,000 to 325,000. California has a progressive income tax, and in 2000, 25% of general fund revenues came from the capital gains tax--Silicon Valley money recycled to Sacramento. But the high-tech stock bubble reached its peak in March 2000. In 2001, revenues came in under estimates by as much as $1 million a day. In May 2001 Davis proposed $3.2 billion in budget cuts. In October 2001 he imposed a state hiring freeze. In January 2002 he said, "I will not advocate raising taxes. That would further burden individuals and businesses struggling to stay afloat in these difficult economic times." But in May 2002, with revenues coming in $19 billion less than expected and an estimated shortfall of $23 billion, he called for increases in license plate fees and the cigarette tax and cuts in Medi-Cal (California's name for Medicaid) and aid to local governments. Davis left the legislature to work out the details and signed a $99 billion budget in September.

In 2000 Davis's job rating was above 50%. It fell to 38% in fall 2001. It began to seem that he was vulnerable even in Democratic California. Liberal Democrats in the legislature saw him as more an adversary than an advocate; Republicans admired his skills, but had no investment in his success. His reputation for competence was undermined by the electricity and budget crises. His strategy from the beginning was, as usual, to disqualify his opponent. Davis was determined to see that he determined who that opponent was. In November 2001, Republican Bill Simon, Jr., son of the former Treasury Secretary and an investor and businessman, announced his candidacy. An opponent of abortion and some gun control measures, Simon preferred to emphasize his platform--cuts in capital gains and property taxes, a 15% cut in state operational spending, using private firms to build new freeways and operate schools. Then, a few days later, former Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan entered the race. A nominal Republican who supported abortion rights, gay rights and gun control, he was encouraged to run by none less than White House political strategist Karl Rove. Riordan, universally known in the Los Angeles media market (where 44% of California Republicans live), led in the initial polls. But he also was anathema to conservatives for his stands on issues and his support of Bill Clinton. Riordan, a wealthy entrepreneur and philanthropist, did not take instruction from political advisers. He repeatedly said that the Republican party had to become more "inclusive" or that it would become an "extinct species." This helped Simon appeal to conservatives, a majority in most Republican primaries. Gray Davis also helped: in the seven weeks before the March 2002 primary, he spent $7 million on ads attacking Riordan for inconsistencies on abortion and other issues. It was money well spent. Simon started to surge in the polls in February and in March won by a stunning 49%-31% margin.

Simon led in some polls after the primary and no poll showed Davis with more than 45% of the vote--a danger sign for an incumbent. And Davis's great strength--his fundraising ability--threatened to be his undoing. In May 2002 it was revealed that Oracle had contributed $25,000 to Davis two weeks after it signed a $95 million deal to provide software to the state. There was no competitive bidding and an audit said that the state was overcharged by $41 million. An official of the major teachers' union said that Davis, in the Capitol, had demanded a contribution of $1 million. The state prison guards' union was one of Davis's biggest contributors; the prison guards had been given unusually generous pay increases.

Davis moved to disqualify Simon. He attacked him as "a true blue think tank conservative"; Simon had been on the board of the Heritage Foundation. He ran ads pointing out that Simon opposed abortion and gun control. He also profited from Simon's missteps. For months Simon refused to disclose his income tax returns. Then in July his campaign allowed reporters to come into a room and examine them there. In San Francisco, Simon said that he would not make an official proclamation of Gay Pride Day, but his campaign had sent a questionnaire back to a gay rights group saying he would. In October Simon revealed an ad with a photograph that he said showed Davis accepting a contribution in the lieutenant governor's office. But the campaign had not done its homework; the room in the photo was in a Los Angeles home. These mistakes cost Simon any chance of spotlighting his own issues. And he didn't have much money to project that message; the $5 million of his own money he spent before the primary and the $6 million he spent during the fall were a substantial percentage of his whole campaign budget. Davis raised a total of $68 million and blanketed the airwaves with ads from July to November. By September both candidates had unfavorable ratings from the voters, and some Republicans were talking about conducting a write-in campaign for Arnold Schwarzenegger. California law allows potential write-ins to register by October 22 with the signatures of 100 voters; fortunately for Schwarzenegger it counts write-ins that misspell the candidate's name. South was alarmed enough to send out negative articles about the actor to the press. But Schwarzenegger, who was busy campaigning for his Proposition 49 to provide after-school programs for children, declined to run.

In May Davis predicted that he would be reelected by "double digits." But in November neither candidate won a majority of the vote. Davis was reelected 47%-42%, with 5% for the Green party candidate. Simon's percentages statewide and in both Coastal and Heartland California were almost identical to George W. Bush's in 2000. Davis won only 59% in the San Francisco Bay area and 56% in Los Angeles County, far below his showings in 1998 and Al Gore's in 2000. Simon carried Heartland California 51%-40% while Davis carried Coastal California 56%-32%. After the election Davis said the looming budget shortfall was not $24 billion but $34 billion, and proposed benefit cuts for state employees, layoffs of 3% of the state work force and cuts in aid to localities and education. The legislature seemed headed for deadlock. Davis's job approval rating in early 2003 fell to 27%.

And his hold on the governorship seemed threatened in February 2003 when two groups of Californians started drives to recall Gray Davis. California law requires some 897,000 signatures, usually readily obtainable through the state's signature collection industry, to put the recall of a governor on a special election ballots. Voters decide on whether to recall the governor and then they vote for a replacement from a list of candidates who file to run. If the governor is recalled, the candidate with a plurality of votes wins. But in March 2003, one firm that had been interested refused, on the ground that it would lose other business, and organizers had nothing like the $2 million needed for a signature drive. A few politicians endorsed the recall effort, notably conservative Republican state Senator Tom McClintock, who came within 17,000 votes of being elected controller in November 2002, and former Secretary of State Bill Jones, who finished third in the March 2002 Republican primary for governor, said that he would file to run if recall were put on the ballot. But Gerald Parsky, the Bush White House's lead man on California politics said that a recall could distract the party and drain away money from the Bush 2004 effort. An April poll showed voters opposed to recall by a 62%-33% vote, so the likelihood was that the recall movement would fizzle out, as have recall movements against other governors. But if the organizers succeed in putting it on the ballot some time in fall 2003, Davis will be in some jeopardy if his poll numbers remain low. The outcome may depend on the palatability of the alternatives on the ballot. Jones and McClintock may run, but Republican leaders will want to have just one serious candidate, if that, so as not to split the Republican vote. Davis will undoubtedly try to keep any serious Democrat off the ballot so that he can campaign, as he has throughout his career, by disqualifying the alternative. But in early 2003 political insiders were saying that State Treasurer Phil Angelides might well file. If so that would present a dilemma for the other Democrats considering running for governor in 2006. But a candidate elected in a 2003 recall will still be eligible to seek two full terms as governor. If a Democrat wins, that would mean that the next time the Democratic nomination would come open would be 2014, a political lifetime away. The same consideration might prompt Arnold Schwarzenegger to file. But he had big-money commitments to make movies over the next few years. Davis is generally known as a dull politician. But California politics will not be dull if the recall organizers succeed.

Update: November 18, 2003

On October 7, 2003, actor Arnold Schwarzenegger won a special recall election to oust Democratic incumbent Gray Davis. Californians voted to remove Davis by a margin of 55.4% to 44.6%, making him the nation's second-ever governor to be recalled and California's first. Schwarzenegger then won 48.6% of the vote among the 135 candidates vying to replace Davis. Democratic Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante finished second with 32%, followed by Republican state Sen. Tom McClintock with 13% and Green Party candidate Peter Camejo with 3%. The other minor candidates divided the rest of the vote.

Schwarzenegger, who had never before sought elected office, captured the governorship in lightning-quick fashion. He announced his intention to run just two months before the election, during an August appearance on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno. Bolstered by his standing as one of Hollywood's leading actors--he starred in popular action films such as Conan the Barbarian, Total Recall, True Lies, and The Terminator series--Schwarzenegger quickly became the Republican frontrunner.

In the closing days of the election, Schwarzenegger's campaign suffered a blow when the Los Angeles Times published allegations that Schwarzenegger had "groped" and "humiliated" various women between 1975 and 2000. In response, Schwarzenegger apologized for having "behaved badly" towards women, and pledged to champion their cause.

Born in Thal, Austria, Schwarzenegger first attracted public attention as a champion bodybuilder. After taking up weightlifting at the age of 15, he went on to win 13 world bodybuilding titles and became the youngest "Mr. Universe" in history. He moved to California in 1968 and, two years later, began his acting career. In 1979, Schwarzenegger earned a correspondence degree in business and international economics from the University of Wisconsin-Superior. In 1983, he became a U.S. citizen; three years later, he married television journalist Maria Shriver, a niece of former President John F. Kennedy. Schwarzenegger eventually became the highest-paid actor in Hollywood, but he also made his fortune acquiring real estate in Santa Monica, California.

A self-described fiscal conservative, Schwarzenegger calls himself "very liberal" on social issues. He supports abortion rights, adoption by gay parents and "sensible gun controls."

Prior to his gubernatorial run, Schwarzenegger worked on issues concerning children and education. As the presidentially appointed Chairman of the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports, he traveled to all 50 states to promote fitness programs. In 1991, he established the National Inner-City Games Foundation, an enrichment program for inner-city youths.

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State Capitol Bldg., Sacramento 95814, 916-445-2841; Fax: 916-445-4633; Web: www.governor.ca.gov.

Election Results (More Info)
	Candidate	Total Votes	Percent
2002 general	Gray Davis (D)	3,533,490	47%
	Bill Simon (R)	3,169,801	42%
	Peter Camejo (Green)	393,036	5%
	Other	379,984	5%
2002 primary	Gray Davis (D)	1,755,276	81%
	Anselmo Chavez (D)	179,301	8%
	Charles Pineda, Jr. (D)	139,121	6%
	Mosemarie Boyd (D)	95,857	4%
1998 general	Gray Davis (D)	4,858,817	58%
	Dan Lungren (R)	3,216,749	38%
	Other	306,305	4%