National Journal Print Friendly

Friday, Dec. 5, 2008


ON AIR

Q&A: Zbigniew Brzezinski

The Former National Security Adviser Says Obama Has 'Enormous Promise,' But He Must Deliver

Atlantic Media Political Director Ronald Brownstein spoke with former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Dec. 5 edition of "National Journal On Air." This is an edited transcript of their discussion.

NJ: Now we have with us Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser for Jimmy Carter and today a counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and also -- and I say this as a fellow scribbler myself -- a dauntingly prolific author. His most recent book, with Brent Scowcroft and David Ignatius, is "America And The World: Conversations On The Future Of American Foreign Policy." Dr. Brzezinski, thank you for joining us on "National Journal on Air."

AUDIO Audio file playback requires Flash player. Download here. Zbigniew Brzezenski

Brzezinski: Delighted to do it.

NJ: President-elect Obama this week named the key members of his national security team: Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates and General Jim Jones. What was your assessment of the team he pulled together?

Brzezinski: I think it's a very strong team in terms of individual capabilities and personal experience. Each one adds an important dimension to our ability to handle foreign affairs. But there is, I think, a potential problem, namely, because they're such strong individuals there could be some problems with coordination, especially since in some respects both the new secretary of State and the retained secretary of Defense have had different perspectives in foreign policy issues than the president-elect. So a great deal depends on the degree to which the president, working through the national security adviser, General Jones, can impose a sense of direction, can impose central strategic control over the shaping of foreign policy.

NJ: You know, one thing that's interesting about this team is that unlike many presidents, he has not chosen long-time confidantes for any of these three positions. I mean, none of these three are people that he has spent enormous time with over the years or were in the foxhole with him, as it were, in the campaign. Is that a challenge?

Brzezinski: Well, first of all it's understandable, because he hasn't been dealing with foreign affairs. His associates have not been really concerned with foreign affairs. His political associates have been concerned with his political career in Illinois and then nationally, and his focus has been largely on domestic issues. But it is a problem. Sure, it is a problem, and that's why he compensates for it by having strong individuals who presume to know something about these subjects and a very strong national security adviser in our former NATO commander and Marine Corps commandant who should be able to crack the whip.

NJ: When you look at the pattern of people who are around him on foreign policy during the primaries, it wasn't absolute but generally he drew most of his advisers from the left side of the spectrum in the Democratic Party. Many of the centrist or perhaps traditional foreign policy thinkers aligned with Hillary Clinton. Barack Obama tended to draw somewhat to the left of that. Now he's put together a team that is very centrist, if not slightly center-right. Does that surprise you?

Brzezinski: It surprises me a little bit, because he put so much emphasis on the notion of change, and I think there is potential risk here that the composition of his administration -- and which you have said is also true, incidentally, of domestic affairs -- may make some of his supporters disappointed.

NJ: When you look at this group, obviously the marquee name is Hillary Rodham Clinton. Does she have what it takes to be a successful secretary of State?

Brzezinski: I think if there is good strategic direction from the center, namely from the White House, and she is its executor, I would say yes. But if she is on her own and asserts her own sort of autonomy and tries to run foreign policy on her own, then I think it is legitimate to ask, well, what exactly are her strategic views, how consistent are they with the president's -- in some instances we know they were quite different -- and can she really pull it off on her own?

NJ: You know, I was going to ask you, does she have an overarching world view? Is there anyone on this team who you would see as possessing an overarching world view, and is that even necessary for this new administration?

Brzezinski: I think some overall concept of what the historical moment is, what are the immediate geopolitical dilemmas, what are the longer-range challenges on the horizon, is needed. And that, to some extent, is not there.

NJ: Let me ask you one final question about the team and then go quickly tour some of the trouble spots around the world and get your thinking. One aspect of the Clinton appointment that is a little unusual is that she is an elected official. I mean, once that was common in our governments. In the 19th century it was common for presidents to pick other elected officials: Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, John Calhoun all served as secretary of State; in the 20th century William Jennings Bryan, Cordell Hull, Jimmy Byrnes -- it's become much less common to do that. You served with Ed Muskie at the end of his career in the Carter administration, Christian Herter in the final years of Eisenhower. We really have not had a working politician in this job in the prime of their career for a long time. Is that background, do you think, an asset, or might it kind of constrain her in the sense of being overly concerned about the domestic implications of foreign policy decisions?

Brzezinski: You know, not every politician is the same, just as not every lawyer is the same. We have had quite a few lawyers, for example, in foreign policy in recent years. Some have worked out, some haven't. I just don't think we can generalize on that basis. She happens to be skillful and adept, and I think he was impressed by her in the course of the campaign, but as I said, I think everything depends on what kind of leadership he provides working through General Jones. If there is central strategic leadership, it will work; if there isn't, it won't work.

NJ: Now let's talk, as I said, about some particular trouble spots and challenges around the globe. A year ago I think many people would have said that the biggest foreign policy problem for the next president would have been winding down the war in Iraq. Now that doesn't look quite as daunting, so what, in your mind, will be the biggest foreign challenge for President Obama?

Brzezinski: I don't think you can single out a single one, but I think it is a cluster of problems located in that area east of Egypt, west of India. And yes, winding down the war looks easier, but it still needs to be done. But you have the Israeli/Palestinian stalemate: Will he have the intellectual foresight and the political guts to give the peace process a real shot, without which I don't think it is likely to go anywhere? Is he prepared to reform, rethink our strategy in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, because we have the possibility of getting bogged down for years? And even more urgently, is he prepared to make a serious effort to negotiate some sort of an arrangement regarding the nuclear program that Iran is pursuing, because that could become a very major problem on his agenda?

NJ: Well, let's walk through some of those. You and General Scowcroft wrote recently in the Washington Post that Obama should "give priority attention" to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Since progress has proven so difficult, his instinct may be to keep it at arm's length. Why should he jump in?

Brzezinski: Well, because if it gets worse, then the problems in the Middle East will deteriorate. We're dealing here with a very volatile region, increasingly susceptible to anti-Americanism because the Arabs in the area think the United States is in fact perpetuating the problem by being unwilling to act. I think there is a real sense of frustration among the Palestinians, who have been occupied now for 40 years, that there is no progress. And that progress cannot come from within, because for historical reasons both the Israelis and the Palestinians are not prepared to make the necessary concessions and certainly no one is prepared to start the concession-making process because each side suspects the other will simply pocket it and not reciprocate. The United States has overwhelming influence, but it's not using it, and I think that is a really serious default.

The only time there was any progress on the Israeli/Palestinian front or the Israeli/Arab front was when Carter pushed hard and from the very beginning. Clinton waited till his last year, and of course he came close, but because he waited so long he couldn't pull it off. Bush basically made the problem worse and hasn't really tried -- tried in the very last year again, the Annapolis process, and he couldn't pull it off. If Obama doesn't do it soon, he won't be able to do it at all.

NJ: Let me ask you about another area you mentioned, Iran. Obama said during the campaign that he wants to talk directly to the Iranian leadership without preconditions. Hillary Clinton initially said that was "irresponsible and frankly naïve." Who's right?

Brzezinski: Well, it all depends, really, but that's an awfully short formulation. It all depends on what there is to talk about and who's one talking to, what is the agenda. So it's not preconditions, but obviously you just don't get into a plane and land there uninvited.

NJ: Since Obama is now the boss, I think we can assume that there will be talks at some point with Iran. Is there anything he can say -- is there a negotiated solution that would dissuade them from pursuing nuclear weapons?

Brzezinski: Well, first of all, you know, they have a nuclear program; there's no doubt about it. There is still no clarity that they are seeking nuclear weapons. The National Intelligence Estimate stated that they had a kind of incipient program some years ago and that they have stopped it. There is no evidence that they are really seeking it, but there are legitimate suspicions -- legitimate suspicions that they may be.

However, their formal position is very different from that of the North Koreans. The North Koreans always said, "Yes, we are and we will." The Iranians are saying, "No, we're not." Well, in that case there's a basis for talking, because we can say to them, well, you are saying you're not, but we don't trust you. Help us trust you. Help us by proving that you're not. You know, there's at least an opening, and we'll find out, but we'll never find out if we don't negotiate.

NJ: Let me ask you three final quick questions. In 18 months do you think the new administration will be more worried about the trajectory of events in Afghanistan or in Pakistan?

Brzezinski: Oh, I think the two are so combined you can't separate them. I think -- if you want a slightly different answer -- I would say it may be worried it is becoming a wider problem in a linkage between what is happening in Pakistan and in India.

NJ: Is the challenge more difficult in terms of stabilizing Afghanistan or in terms of putting Pakistan on a path toward greater responsibility in the international community?

Brzezinski: You know, unfortunately you can't separate the two, because the two countries are separated by a fictitious borderline called the Durand Line, drawn by the British but it separates the Pashtuns, who are a major presence in Afghanistan and a major presence in Pakistan. So there is a kind of organic linkage in spite of the frontier between the two countries. And their problems, unfortunately, now have become closely linked.

NJ: Two final thoughts. President Obama comes into office very popular around the globe in a way that President Bush was not. Is that a tangible asset for him and the country? Can he use that popularity in any way to advance our interests?

Brzezinski: Well, it's an enormous asset provided it's used, because it's going to wane. He's never going to be more popular than he is now and in the first year of his presidency. And if he doesn't use it to address some problems, and in particular those that are susceptible to real progress like the Israeli/Palestinian peace process -- because both the Israelis and the Palestinians on the popular level are recognizing the need for change, the need for accommodation, but it needs to be helped -- if he doesn't do it, he's going to miss out.

NJ: Finally, in your second most recent book, "Second Chance: Three Presidents And The Crisis Of American Superpower," which by the way is a terrific read, you gave each of our last presidents letter grades for their performance in foreign policy. Well, obviously you can't grade Obama's performance yet, but from what you have heard from him during the primaries and general election, what grade would you give him for his thinking and his understanding of the way to proceed?

Brzezinski: Well, I would give him a very high grade. That is why almost a year and a half ago I endorsed him -- because I was impressed by his intelligence and his perspective on the world. But it's like a grade that you're giving to someone who's, let's say, about to get admitted into a school, since we're using school terms. Then the rest is performance. I would say there's enormous promise here, enormous promise. But then, of course, it has to be delivered.

NJ: Dr. Brzezinski, as always, provocative and insightful. Thank you for joining "National Journal on Air."

Brzezinski: Nice to be with you.