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Navy secretary under President Reagan in the '80s and a member of the bipartisan 9/11 commission, John Lehman has known John McCain for 30 years. He is now one of McCain's principal advisers on defense.

NJ: How would President McCain pay for increasing the size of the military, resetting worn-out equipment, and modernization, especially given the pressure to do away with supplemental spending bills?

Lehman: The senator believes strongly that we are succeeding in Iraq, and that this will enable us to steadily reduce operations. As the Iraqi government takes more and more responsibility, we'll be less directly involved, with lower and lower expenditures.

He does not believe in supplementals. Sometimes they are necessary, but as a normal way of life, this is not the way to manage. So he will realistically build a budget and send it to the Hill that includes the level of operations that he believes will be required.

The entire approach to defense planning will be effectively rebooted. He believes strongly that the current defense procurement system--the whole agglomeration of layers and layers of bureaucracy and agencies and committees and subcommittees on the Hill--has created a chaotic and dysfunctional system for procuring our weapons systems, and that has to be fundamentally reformed.

It is not something that has to take years and years to do. It does not require huge legislative changes; it requires a president who recognizes the problem and runs his relationship with Congress accordingly.

We're not talking a major redrawing of organization charts. We're talking about restoring a clear, accountable line of authority, which will once again enable rational decision-making to take place in both branches.

NJ: To what extent are you talking about rolling back the acquisition reforms of the 1990s?

Lehman: I wouldn't use the words "rolling back." It is learning the lessons of some ill-advised reforms and restoring a management system where authority and accountability are in the same hands--as opposed to being dispersed through 22 assistant secretaries and various interagency groups and joint requirements offices and joint staffs. We're doing nothing but designing camels, with everybody able to initiate change orders in programs and nobody being held accountable or even having the authority to maintain the discipline and just say no to gold-plating. A succession of well-intended reforms has dissipated and fractured and dispersed authority and line management in the acquisition process. Hence, every program is in trouble, not just some shipbuilding programs or big-ticket fighter planes or Army systems: Every program is overrunning, because of this dysfunctional system.

NJ: Many people around McCain talk about a target of spending at least 4 percent of gross domestic product on defense. Is that feasible?

Lehman: He doesn't do budgeting by targets. The number will be what it will be after he has done the thorough analysis and programming and planning, and comes forward with the defense program fully programmed and budgeted that he believes is necessary. That may be 3 percent, it may be 5 percent, but he's not aiming for a target. In all probability, it will be at least as high as the current budget level.

NJ: Some in the Obama camp criticize McCain as a Cold Warrior, still stuck in a black-and-white world and unable to recognize new threats that ignore borders. How do you respond?

Lehman: That Obama cartoon view of McCain that you've just described doesn't at all relate to McCain himself. This is a guy who has for 25 years been a major figure in the [annual] Munich national security conference, a guy who knows leaders of all political persuasions in Asia, in Europe, and in Africa. He has been very actively involved in helping to support private [relief groups], and he understands that one of the greatest payoffs we could have in dealing with Islamist fundamentalism is education assistance. He [has] supported the so-called soft-power initiatives relentlessly. But he also understands that diplomacy without military power is like music without musical instruments.

So that dog won't hunt, as much as the Obama surrogates try to preach it. Unlike a President Bush or a President Clinton or a candidate Obama, we [would] have a president here who is the thinker-in-chief. He's been thinking and living national security since he was 17 years old. He's an insatiable reader of history and biography, and he's spent his life building an understanding of the world. He doesn't need a foreign-policy brain trust to put together a vision for him. He's got it in his mind. It will come from him, not some brain trust.