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Was U.S. Intel on Bin Laden Off Target? Was U.S. Intel on Bin Laden Off Target?

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Was U.S. Intel on Bin Laden Off Target?


UNKNOWN, AFGHANISTAN - NOVEMBER 8: A latest picture shows Saudi-dissident Osama bin Laden sits on floor with his AK-47 rifle in his hide outs in Afghanistan 08 November, 2001. Osama bin Laden in an interview with a Pakistani newspaper denied reports he had been hospitalized in Dubai for kidney treatment. (FILM) (Photo credit should read STR-AUSAF NEWS PAPERF/AFP/Getty Images)(STR-AUSAF NEWS PAPERF/AFP/Getty Images)

Nearly two weeks after the daring U.S. raid that caught Osama bin Laden by lethal surprise at his compound in Pakistan, it remains unclear how much direct control he had over al-Qaida’s operations, according to U.S. officials and terror experts.

That, in turn, has raised questions about the accuracy of the intelligence community’s previous assessments of bin Laden as well as uncertainties over how the terror group he founded will evolve now that he is gone.


Based on a vast trove of information removed from the walled-off compound in Abbottabad, including a personal journal, U.S. intelligence officials say that, contrary to previous indications, bin Laden was not merely a figurehead removed from terror planning or someone who had largely lost his grip on al-Qaida. Instead, there were clear signs that he maintained strategic, operational, and tactical control of al-Qaida.

“There were communications from other senior leaders going back to him, asking him for advice and ideas on who to use” for operations, said a U.S. official who is part of a national-security team reviewing the recovered material. Without being specific, the official added: “He needed to approve certain operatives for certain things. Senior leaders needed to come to him for permission to do certain things.”

Even so, U.S. officials could not immediately point to evidence that any of the plots bin Laden mulled over in his compound actually became operational. And that raised questions about whether he was planning and directing specific acts of terror that his subordinates were carrying out -- which was loosely the process that led to the 9/11 attacks -- or whether he had become a kind of chairman of the board, several steps removed.


“We don’t know yet the degree to which he was operational in the sense of day-to-day control versus operational in the sense of broad strategic oversight of operation,” said a former senior intelligence official. “If I were still working there, I would probably say to them, ‘Show me the details. What do you mean?’ ”

Current government officials dispute that earlier intelligence assessments on bin Laden were off the mark.

“CIA analysts have assessed for years that bin Laden was involved in operational planning, timing, and target selection for al-Qaida plots,” the U.S. official said. “The CIA also assessed that bin Laden has, throughout the years, focused on different aspects of the group’s operations at different times. Although he was physically isolated from the group’s foot soldiers, he was able to guide their plotting.”

The official said that plots sometimes take years to filter through the planning stage and get carried out, pointing to some of the ideas found in the bin Laden compound for attacking the United States, including targeting trains in cities such as New York, Washington and Chicago. “Just because we haven’t seen them attack trains doesn’t mean that they didn’t intend to do so. We do know that al-Qaida has been focused on attacking the U.S. homeland,” and that’s what bin Laden wanted.


For years, government officials have mostly hedged in discussing bin Laden and his relationship to the core of al-Qaida. Before he was caught in Abbottabad, his trail had gone largely cold. One the one hand, they said the group remained dangerous and aspired to carry out spectacular attacks. Officials also said splinter groups such as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula posed the biggest threat to U.S. interests.

But the larger narrative painted for the public in recent years was that the group bin Laden led was under enormous pressure and its powers were diminished. Many intelligence officials also pushed the idea that al-Qaida had become much more decentralized, relying on freelance radicals who communicated via the Internet, among them Anwar al-Awlaki, the radical cleric believed to be in Yemen. U.S. intelligence officials had also suggested previously that bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, was mostly in control of operations. 

All of which raises a number of important questions: Is the intelligence community still trying to promote different narratives? Were U.S. intelligence assessments about the terrorist leader off target? What kind of control did bin Laden actually have?

Speaking at the Atlantic Council in November 2008, former CIA Director Michael Hayden said bin Laden was believed to be isolated. “He is putting a lot of energy into his own survival, a lot of energy into his own security. In fact, he appears to be largely isolated from the day-to-day operations of the organization he nominally heads,” according to a transcript of the speech on the Atlantic Council’s website.

Hayden told National Journal he stands by his comments. He said intelligence officials at the time questioned whether bin Laden could really have operational and tactical control over al-Qaida.

“We were very confident, turns out to have been very true, he didn’t have electronic communications. And the courier network was … not so robust that it would seem to truly offer him tight tactical control,” Hayden said. “This raises some interesting questions. What do they mean by 'more robust operational control,' particularly since he was doing this through periodic couriers?”

Michael Hirsh contributed contributed to this article.

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