Seeking Kremlin Engagement, NATO Weighs Next Nuclear Posture Steps

This article was originally published in Global Security Newswire, produced independently by National Journal Group under contract with the Nuclear Threat Initiative. NTI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan group working to reduce global threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

For its part, France has resisted calls for alliance-wide tactical nuclear reductions, seeking to avoid any uptick in international pressure to cut its own national arsenal of 300 nuclear arms. In the run-up to the Chicago conference, the French government succeeded in limiting the scope of pondered alliance reductions in the organization’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review to “nuclear weapons assigned to NATO,” or, in other words, U.S. nuclear arms.

As part of a bid to reduce its defense spending, the United Kingdom in June unilaterally committed to chopping 40 warheads from its nuclear stockpile, leaving it with 180 weapons, 120 of which would remain active.

The Kremlin’s limited interest in tactical nuclear reductions stems largely from its reliance on atomic weapons to offset technological and numerical advantages in NATO's conventional military posture, according to officials and experts.

“Since neither side wants to reduce its nonstrategic forces because of disparity or to compensate for conventional inferiority, NATO is now limiting itself to pursuing softer issues such as transparency and confidence-building measures,” Kristensen said at a recent conference in Switzerland. “These are important and worthwhile steps but they will not in and of themselves result in reductions of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”

Proposed transparency efforts might include declarations of the atomic arms that NATO and Russia have fielded on the continent, as well as possibly their storage locations, according to expert assessments.

Confidence-building steps under possible consideration could include dialogue about nuclear doctrine or perhaps even unilateral actions to relocate or dismantle some of these arms, issue specialists say.

NATO nations have decided, though, that they will not publicize their proposed list ahead of sharing it with the Kremlin, said Steven Pifer of the Brookings Institution. Rather than attempt to score political points, the intent is to discuss the list with Russian leaders in a quiet diplomatic effort to explore which, if any, specific initiatives might be feasible.

The Atlantic partners have decided they do not want to “put the Russians in a corner,” but rather would pursue in good faith the potential for a new cooperative regime, Pifer said in a Tuesday interview.

On the thornier issue of negotiating reciprocal reductions to NATO and Russian nonstrategic nuclear forces, the alliance in 2010 laid the initial groundwork for its own arsenal cuts when it “cleaned out” of its “Strategic Concept” prior references to the tactical warheads as “an essential political and military link” assuring Washington’s commitment to Europe’s defense, Kristensen said.

NATO should not make too much of the Kremlin’s rejection to date of discussing tactical nuclear arms reductions, said Pifer, citing a quip he heard recently: “The Russians are going to say no until they say yes.”

Internal alliance debate continues over whether NATO should accept Moscow’s desired restrictions on its missile defense plans in exchange for pullbacks or reductions in tactical atomic arms.

“I think the Russians are playing a waiting game,” the former U.S. ambassador said, noting that Washington’s plans for ballistic missile defenses could change significantly if Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney wins the November election.

In casual remarks heard on a live microphone in Seoul, South Korea, President Obama last March told then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that he would have “more flexibility” to discuss potential missile defense options “after my election” in November. Former Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin succeeded Medvedev as president in May.

Whether any future arms control deal on missile defenses – viewed unlikely until early next year at the soonest -- might also include nonstrategic offensive weapons has yet to be determined.

Issue experts differ on whether any such grand bargain would be a good idea for the United States and its allies, even if Russia were willing.

“I do not support the U.S. modifying its missile defense plans in Europe to achieve a reduction in Russian [tactical nuclear forces] because I don’t think that gambit is worth it or that it will work,” said Frank Miller, a former Defense policy official now at the Scowcroft Group.

At the same time, he said, “it would take a political decision in Moscow that they want to take a new tack.”

Meantime, NATO is not constrained from taking whatever action it deems necessary, in Miller’s view.  The alliance statement about “reciprocity” does not actually preclude the alliance from making any unilateral changes to its deployed atomic forces as it sees fit, rather than await action from Moscow, he said in an interview.

“Do the Russians really care about reciprocating? No,” Miller said. “Do the Russians really care about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? No.”

Miller also said the Kremlin is unlikely to be drawn into an agreement in which it would significantly cut its nonstrategic atomic weapons.

“Will Russia be magnanimous and volunteer to reduce [its] forces by 50 percent?” he asked. “No.”

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